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Introduction   
 
The 2014 crisis in Ukraine marked a tipping point in NATO’s relationship with Russia. 
That relationship had been difficult for many years and particularly fraught since the 
Russo-Georgia war of 2008. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, however, summarily ended a 
prolonged period of cooperation dating back to the end of the Cold War. At its 
September 2014 summit, NATO declared that ‘Russia’s aggressive actions [… have] 
fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.’ The allies 
pledged to ‘reverse the trend of declining defence budgets’ and adopted a package of 
measures designed to reassure its eastern allies and reconfigure its ‘military strategic 
posture.’1   
 How do we account for NATO’s abandonment of partnership and consequent 
strategic reorientation?  It could be argued that over Ukraine NATO simply reverted to 
                                                     
1 ‘Wales Summit Declaration’ (5 September 2014), paragraphs.1, 6 and 14, available at: 
{www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?selectedLocale=en}. 
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type - emphasizing its core military purpose in the face of Russian aggression. The 
suddenness and persistence of NATO’s action is puzzling, however, in three respects. 
First, NATO had not reacted similarly to previous episodes of Russian bellicosity. 
Russia’s war with Georgia in 2008, and the Russia-Belarus Zapad 2009 and 2013 
military exercises (the former culminating in a simulated nuclear strike on Warsaw) 
caused alarm in Poland and the Baltic States but did not lead the US and the major 
European allies to shift NATO toward countering Moscow. Such reluctance could have 
reflected political complacency or a residual belief in the necessity of partnership.2 
Either way, NATO avoided placing Russia and collective defence centre-stage. In fact, 
Alliance policy since the early 1990s had given equal standing to cooperative security 
and conflict management (hence, force projection and expeditionary missions in the 
Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya). Its reorientation from 2014 was, therefore, a signal 
shift of purpose. That reorientation, second, was unprecedented in its decisiveness. 
Given NATO’s earlier unwillingness to confront Russia, one might have anticipated an 
allied response limited to political declarations and a suspension of practical 
cooperation (as had happened after the Russo-Georgian war).  The differentiated 
exposure of the Allies to Russia also made such a course appear likely. Robust action 
corresponded to the preferences of Poland and the Baltic States, but not necessarily 
those of NATO’s southern and Balkan states or of the powerful quartet of France, 
Germany, the UK and the US.  In the event, these issues were put aside and consensus 
was joined on a military response. Third, NATO moved toward collective defence in 
response to the destabilization of a non-member. Such a move might seem explicable in 
                                                     
2 Anne Applebaum, ‘Obama and Europe: Missed Signals, Renewed Commitments’, 
Foreign Affairs, 94:5 (2015), pp.40-41.  
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precautionary terms, as a means of ameliorating the concerns of allies near to Ukraine.  
However, that NATO elevated a regional problem to one of existential significance bears 
some scrutiny.  
 Our positing of NATO’s reaction to the Ukraine crisis as a puzzle may seem 
counter-intuitive. After all, would one not expect an alliance to respond robustly to 
aggression near its borders? Such a supposition is not, however, as sound as it might 
appear. The balancing logic upon which it is based may smack of conventional wisdom 
but (as we show below) that logic is flawed. The puzzle, therefore, remains: why did 
NATO act in such a manner on this occasion when comparable precedents for balancing 
existed? Why, in other words, is the Ukraine crisis distinct from previous episodes of 
NATO-Russia discord to the extent that Russia assumed the status of a threat to the 
Alliance as such?  Attending to that question, further, allows us to say something of 
significance about NATO and regional security institutions more broadly: how is it that 
such bodies assume actorness or agency in response to a threat that is collectively 
defined?   
 Securitization theory (ST) offers a productive framework to address these issues. 
From 2014 NATO unambiguously adopted language and policies which positioned 
Russia as a clear threat. As we show in the next section, standard IR theories cannot 
account for this shift satisfactorily because their consideration of threat is too narrowly 
drawn or too detached from their core theoretical claims. ST, by contrast, makes the 
conceptualization and reaction to threat the direct object of analysis utilizing the 
concept of referent object, a malleable categorization of those social and political units 
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which are threatened and which have ‘a legitimate claim to survival.’3 For NATO, the 
Crimean annexation undermined the European and international order, an order which 
the Alliance regarded itself as custodian. Russian behavior also held implications for 
NATO directly, for the security of its eastern members and thus for the credibility of 
NATO’s core functions of deterrence and reassurance.  Viewed this way, the referent 
object for NATO was not the integrity of Ukraine. Expressions of concern in this regard 
belied the fact that something more important was at stake: European security 
governance - a system of order with NATO as the presumptive core - was seen to be 
threatened.  
 Through the NATO-Russia case, we consider an over-looked aspect of ST. In its 
original formulation, ST did not regard securitizing actors (those who speak security) as 
limited to the state.4  We extend this position by suggesting that collectives of states can 
be construed as both the actor and referent of security.  As such, we demonstrate the 
relevance of a phenomenon we label collective securitization. In the military domain, 
such an approach has been left unexplored because here ST assumes that expressions of 
security are reducible to the state acting alone.  Collective securitization relaxes that 
assumption and so advances ST in four novel ways.   
 First, through the conceptual apparatus of the most influential variant of ST, the 
Copenhagen School (CS), we offer a fresh take on the core concepts of securitizing actor 
and audience. In doing so, we are able to account for a neglected class of phenomena: 
securitization within a formal institutional setting.  Here, the organization in question 
                                                     
3 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis 
(Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p.36.  
4 Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), pp. 42, 45.   
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articulates security discourse and policy but derives its ability to do so from repeated 
interactions with its member states.  That process (what below we refer to as recursive 
interaction) means the member states serve as the validating audience of a 
securitization move and provide an organization with agency in responding to threats.  
We show thereby that a body like NATO can successfully initiate and define the 
securitization process. Second, we correct a thematic bias of ST.  The delimitation of 
‘security sectors’ to the political, societal, economic, environmental (but all too rarely 
the military) has led ST to overlook both defence policy and regional security alliances 
as subjects of enquiry.5  Analysing collective securitization within NATO begins to make 
good that neglect. Third, our focus on NATO illustrates how securitization is a dynamic 
and reversible process.  ST had always allowed for desecuritization but the recent 
history of NATO-Russia relations reveals a process of resecuritization, a return to Cold 
War policies and discourse, albeit reshaped by the experience of the intervening 
decades. Lastly, while our empirical analysis of collective securitization is tailored to 
NATO post-Crimea, our model is generalizable to other institutional settings and 
different security sectors.  
 The article proceeds as follows. Its first section considers the limitations of IR 
theory in accounting for NATO’s actions in light of the Crimea/Ukraine crises. The 
second examines issues within ST in order to establish the continuing relevance of CS.  
The third section then amends ST and so opens the analytical space for an international 
organization to engage in securitization on behalf of states.  The fourth section presents 
a stylised model of collective securitization to illustrate how such a process occurs. That 
                                                     
5 Mathias Albert and Barry Buzan, ‘Securitization, Sectors, and Functional 
Differentiations’, Security Dialogue, 42:4-5 (2011), pp.413-25.  
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model is then applied in an empirical section that traces the post-Cold War de-
securitization of the Soviet Union/Russia and the subsequent re-securitization of Russia 
precipitated by the annexation of Crimea. In the conclusion we consider three caveats to 
our argument.  
 
 
 
NATO-Russia and the Limitations of IR Theory   
NATO’s reorientation after 2014 might be susceptible to explanations drawn from 
established theories of alliances. Each, however, is deficient in important regards.  
 A first, seemingly straightforward, approach rests with realism. There is no 
single realist voice upon which one can draw in reference to the Ukraine crisis. 
Certainly, prominent realists have commented on the events surrounding Ukraine, John 
Mearsheimer most notably. Mearsheimer’s position on Ukraine is, however, useful only 
up to a point in that he is more concerned with Russian threat perceptions than those 
held by the Alliance (arguing that Moscow acted in order to pre-empt Ukraine joining 
NATO and being converted into a ‘Western bastion’).6 His earlier, more general 
argument that great powers will balance in order to contain ‘a dangerous opponent’ 
could, however, have some traction in NATO’s case- at least, if we accept Mearsheimer’s 
view of NATO as an instrument of American hegemony.7 The logic of this position is that 
Russia’s revisionist behaviour in regard to Ukraine has been met by the US, with its 
                                                     
6 John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault’, Foreign Affairs, 93:5 
(2014).  
7 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York and London: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 2001), pp.139, 379.  
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NATO allies in tow, in order to close off avenues for further expansion.8  
 This preoccupation with balancing is, of course, common to realism,9 but it is 
perhaps best typified by Stephen Walt’s ‘balance of threat’ proposition.10 Walt’s 
argument that alliances such as NATO mobilize to counter threats seems well-suited to 
the Ukraine crisis. If Russia’s seizure of Crimea marked the return of ‘geopolitical 
rivalries […] to centre stage’11 then the repercussion for NATO is obvious: heightened 
threat required of the Alliance a turn toward renewed balancing as a means of 
protecting its newly exposed eastern allies.12 There are at least three limitations to this 
argument however. Even accepting balancing by NATO can be demonstrated 
empirically, these limitations lead us to reject realism’s explanation of it.     
First, Walt’s is a theory of alliance formation not alliance behaviour. This 
distinction matters because an alliance of long duration such as NATO will respond to 
threats in a manner that is influenced by established modes of practice, norms of 
behaviour and received understandings of its threat environment. Second, even if we 
                                                     
8 Here, we paraphrase Glenn H. Snyder’s reading of Mearsheimer. See his 
‘Mearsheimer’s World – Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: a Review 
Essay’, International Security, 27:1 (2002), p.158.  
9 See Snyder (2002), who views Mearsheimer’s ‘offensive realism’ and Kenneth Waltz’s 
‘defensive realism’ as having this shared preoccupation.  
10 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
11 Walter Russell Mead, ‘The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist 
Powers’, Foreign Affairs, 93:3 (2014), p.69.  
12 Mathew Kroenig, ‘Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War’, Survival, 
57:1 (2015).  
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transplant balance of threat theory to established alliances it remains an awkward fit. 
The four sources of threat (aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and 
aggressive intentions) which Walt identifies as bearing upon alliance formation13 do not 
all pertain when applied to NATO’s reaction to Russia after March 2014. Since 2008, 
Russia had registered both quantitative and qualitative improvements in its armed 
forces including the development of force-projection assets.14 However, as Walt himself 
has pointed out, aggregate power (population, economic resources and military 
capability) has not moved in Russia’s favour when compared to the combined power of 
NATO.15 The objective level of threat to NATO did not, therefore, shift as a consequence 
of the Ukraine crisis. Perceptions of aggressive intent are, however, a different matter. 
Those NATO allies in proximity to Russia – the Baltic States and Poland – did register a 
heightened sense of threat, one rooted in their experience of aggression and occupation 
during the Soviet period.  It should come as no surprise, therefore, that these states have 
been loudest in calling for measures to counter Russia. But this takes us to a third 
caveat. Realist positions (and this applies to Mearsheimer as well as Walt) draw 
inferences on alliance behavior from the material environment (the distribution of 
capabilities and the balance of power or threat) within which the alliance in question is 
situated.   Walt allows that perceptions of threat will influence this process but a crucial 
                                                     
13 Walt (1987), pp.21-26.  
14 Dmitri Trenin, ‘The Revival of the Russian Military: How Moscow Reloaded’, Foreign 
Affairs, 95:3 (2016), pp.23-26.  
15 Stephen M. Walt, ‘NATO Owes Putin a Big Thank-You’, Foreign Policy blog (4 
September 2014) available at: {http:foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/04/nato-owes-putin-
a-big-thank-you/}  
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causal mechanism is left unspecified. No theoretical space is given to how perceptions of 
offensive intent are aggregated within alliances or how such perceptions are converted 
into policy.16 
Institutionalist explanations are similarly deficient. In its rationalist form, 
institutionalism has offered a persuasive account of NATO’s resilience and adaptability, 
but it has done so largely without reference to NATO’s external threat environment.17 
Institutionalism, in other words, identifies how NATO has changed but not why. If the 
policy shift from 2014 was made possible by the possession of flexible institutional 
assets (in the same way that such assets facilitated NATO’s operational evolution in the 
first two decades after the Cold War) we still need to ask what prompted the use of 
those assets in the first place? Inferentially, the shift can be explained either functionally 
(NATO remained possessed of assets of collective defence and so function followed 
form) or by recourse to state preferences (NATO was the optimal format for collective 
action to counter Russian behaviour). However, it is not clear from such accounts why 
collective defence was elevated to high importance and why so suddenly. Indeed, on 
institutional grounds one might have expected the opposite - NATO being slow to act 
and doing so inconclusively. As Robert McCalla has argued, an alliance which assumes a 
                                                     
16 Robert O. Keohane, ‘Alliances, Threats and the Uses of Neorealism’, International 
Security, 13:1 (1988), p.172.  
17 Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘NATO and Institutional Theories of International Relations’, 
in Mark Webber and Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.), Theorising NATO: New Perspectives on 
the Atlantic Alliance (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), pp.22-40.  
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multiplicity of tasks will become ‘less responsive [...] to changes in the threats it faces.’18 
Change is confounded because state and bureaucratic interests coalesce around 
competing priorities and institutional resources are stretched across different tasks.  
Sociological institutionalism differs markedly from its rationalist variant. Here, 
institutions are not primarily functional in nature, but rather normative. They embody a 
common identity and condition their members toward appropriate modes of behaviour 
based on shared values and social norms reinforced by practice. NATO, accordingly, is 
less a functional organization concerned with managing its members’ security problems 
and more a ‘self-defined institutional expression of the Western liberal-democratic 
community.’19 Such an interpretation overlaps with analyses which view NATO as part 
of a broader, normatively-defined security community. Certainly, such a view sits 
readily with how the Alliance developed during the Cold War, a period when the threat 
NATO faced was cultural and civilizational as much as military.20 In the years since, the 
absence of a single, animating Other has necessarily directed attention to NATO’s 
interior character - the habits or practices of its members, the identity and norms which 
                                                     
18 Robert B. McCalla, ‘NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War’, International 
Organization, 50:3 (1996), p.470.  
19 Alexandra Gheciu, ‘Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 
“New Europe”’, International Organization, 59:4 (2005), p.975.  
20 Bradley Klein, ‘How the West Was One: Representational Politics of NATO’, 
International Studies Quarterly, 34:3 (1990). 
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bind them together, and NATO’s ability to persist and enlarge.21 This is not to say that 
external threat is missing from the analysis or, indeed, that threat is assumed to be 
fixed. NATO has been seen, for instance, as preoccupied with managing ‘shared security 
risks’ (rather than with deterring a single common threat).22 Yet whether defined as 
threat or risk a distinct logic is at play. As an expression of security community, NATO’s 
norms and identity determine how it acts upon the outside world. Thus, the Alliance 
intervened in the Balkans in the 1990s because conflicts there challenged ‘Atlantic 
sensibilities’ on human rights.23 It acted in Libya in 2011 for similar reasons.24 As for 
Russia, security community analysis has viewed it, even prior to the Ukraine crisis, as at 
odds with NATO ‘over the rules of the international security game.’25 Yet Russia was still 
positioned as a conditional partner, beyond the reach of integration but still susceptible 
to security management. The lurch from partnership to antagonism from 2014 marked 
                                                     
21 Emanuel Adler, ‘The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-
Restraint, and NATO’s Post-Cold War Transformation’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 14:2 (2008).  
22 Michael John Williams, NATO, Security and Risk Management: From Kosovo to 
Kandahar (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p.35.  
23 Victoria Kitchen, ‘Argument and Identity Change in the Atlantic Security Community’, 
Security Dialogue, 40:1 (2009), p.106.  
24 Simon Koschut, ‘Emotional (Security) Communities: the Significance of Emotion 
Norms in Inter-Allied Conflict Management’, Review of International Studies, 40:3 
(2014).  
25 Vincent Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia 
Diplomacy (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.235.  
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Russia’s departure from this ‘security game’ and confirmation of its outsider status. 
Security community is the benchmark against which that separation can be judged. The 
concept lacks, however, an analytical tool that specifies how the separation occurred. 
For that, we now turn to ST.  
 
Securitization Theory 
From ST certain core assumptions can be elicited relevant to the process of collective 
securitization.  To that end, we draw upon CS, still the most influential (and debated) 
contribution to the securitization literature. Two considerations dictated our choice. 
First, given the near absence of securitization scholarship in relation to NATO an 
underlying task of this article is to establish the appropriateness of ST as such. There is 
no unified or ‘grand theory’ of securitization upon which we can call in this respect,26 
but CS occupies the ‘city-centre’ of securitization scholarship. Its foundational concepts 
thus have a justified claim to be the starting point of application.27 Second, the 
‘neighbourhoods’ of ST (to continue the analogy) are less suited to the object of our 
concern. The so-called Paris School, for instance, does not view securitization primarily 
through rhetorical performance,28 a weakness in the case under consideration given 
                                                     
26 Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Léonard and Jan Ruzicka, ‘”Securitization” Revisited: Theory 
and Cases’, International Relations (online early, 2015) p.24.  
27 Alex Kreidenweis, ‘Welcome to Copenhagen: A Tour Guide to Securitization Theory’, 
available at {www.academia.edu/4896122/Welcome_to_Copenhagen_A_ 
Tour_Guide_to_Securitization_Theory} 
28 Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzick (2015), p.11.  
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that the rupture in NATO-Russia relations from 2014 was occasioned most obviously by 
a marked shift of discourse.   
 In its original formulation, CS viewed ST as having a twofold purpose. First, ST 
explained how issues moved from the realm of ‘normal’ politics to the realm of security 
where the state could bypass democratic discourse and procedure. Second, ST isolated 
the mechanisms whereby such a move was enacted.  Securitization is initiated by a 
speech act, a ‘securitizing move’  ‘through which an intersubjective understanding is 
constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a 
valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal 
with the threat.’29 The alternative, desecuritization process, shifts ‘issues off the 
“security” agenda and back into the realm of public political discourse and “normal” 
political dispute and accommodation.’30  Three issues—state-centrism, threat 
construction, and audience role— have been contested within ST.  Our preliminary 
purpose here is to set up the CS approach as relevant despite these concerns. The 
further amendments necessary for a theory of collective securitization are then 
considered in the next section.  
 The first issue revolves around the ‘Westphalian straitjacket’ that embeds the CS 
in Euro-centric understandings of state capacity and which privileges the role of 
                                                     
29 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International 
Security, (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 491.  
30 Michael C. Williams, ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International 
Politics’, International Studies Quarterly, 47:4 (2003), p. 523.  
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authoritative governing elites in threat definition.31 This charge of state-centrism is only 
partially justified. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver have argued that the CS is ‘not 
dogmatically state-centric in its premises’ even if for ‘contingent, empirical reasons […] 
securitization theory is […] somewhat state-centric in its findings.’32 In fact, a not 
insignificant literature exists informed by ST in which both inter-governmental and 
non-governmental actors are given due consideration.33  In a recent intervention, ST has 
been explicitly applied to NATO,34 and there is a body of work of longer-standing which, 
informed by ST, regards NATO through a discursive lens.35  These studies are not, 
                                                     
31 Claire Wilkinson, ‘The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization 
Theory Useable Outside Europe?’ Security Dialogue, 38:1 (2007), pp. 5–25.  
32 Buzan and Wæver (2003), p.71.   
33  Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Non-traditional Security and Infectious Diseases in ASEAN:  
Going beyond the Rhetoric of Securitization to Deeper Institutionalization’, Pacific 
Review, 21:4 (2008), pp.507-25; Jef Huysmans, ‘The European Union and the 
Securitization of Migration’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38:5 (2000), pp. 751-
77; Tine Hanrieder and Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, ‘WHO Decides on the Exception?  
Securitization and Emergency Governance in Global Health’, Security Dialogue, 45:4 
(2014), pp. 331-48; Jocelyn Vaughan, ‘The Unlikely Securitizer: Humanitarian 
Organizations and the Securitization of Indistinctiveness’, Security Dialogue, 40:3 
(2009), pp. 263-85.  
34 Gabi Schlag, ‘Securitization Theory and the Evolution of NATO’, in Webber and Hyde-
Price (eds.) (2016), pp.161-182. 
35 For instance, Andreas Behnke, NATO’s Security Discourse after the Cold War 
Representing the West (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).   
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however, about collective securitization, insofar as they simply swap one actor (the 
state) for another (an international or non-governmental organization) as the focus of 
analytical attention. What interests us, rather, is the neglected question of how a group 
of states undertakes securitization in concert and how, at the international level, that 
process is expressed and institutionalized. CS initially held out this possibility in 
relation to the EU.36 We see no reason why it cannot be extended to NATO. 
 As for threat construction, the initial and influential claim of the CS was that the 
speech act itself constituted ‘security’ not the ‘something more real’ which the act 
described.37  Such a position is now seen as untenable. The speech act is not separate 
from reality; it only interprets it in a particular way.38 What threats become subject to 
securitization is, in fact, a matter of political choice.39 Both national and system-wide 
dynamics are relevant here. States will of necessity respond to threats which impact 
upon them directly (when their territorial integrity, national identity or constitutional 
order is infringed). Acting collectively in the face of such threats cannot be excluded 
(acts of solidarity are possible), but collective securitization is more likely to occur 
when a threat has a systemic referent (impinging upon international and collective 
                                                     
36 Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), pp.179-189.  
37 Ole Wæver, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed), On 
Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p.55.  
38 Colin McInnes and Simon Rushton, ‘HIV/AIDS and Securitization Theory’, Security 
Dialogue, 19:1 (2011), p. 118. 
39 Ole Wæver, ‘Politics, Security, Theory’, Security Dialogue, 42:4-5 (2011), pp.468, 472.  
16 
 
identities, or the rules and norms governing interstate interactions).40 NATO’s character 
as a military alliance bound by a mutual defence pledge and as a community of norms 
means it embraces both these dynamics. 
 The third contested issue concerns the precise relationship between the 
securitizing actor and its audience.  In their original formulation, Buzan, Wæver and de 
Wilde suggested ‘an issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as 
such.’41 The act of acceptance, however, was left unexplored thus leaving the audience 
marginalized as an analytical category. 42  More recently, Wæver has argued that 
securitization involves political interaction between both actor and audience through 
which agreement is reached on what constitutes the source of insecurity.43 Viewing 
securitization in this manner has two advantages. First, it points to a process that is 
ongoing, one that entails dialogue, negotiation and compromise rather than a single, 
unidirectional transaction by the securitizing actor. Here, the audience becomes more 
than a passive recipient of a securitizing move; it empowers that move and may even 
initiate it.  This process within an international organization we define as recursive 
                                                     
40 Although published well before the notion of securitization was conceived, our 
thinking here is influenced by Wolfram Hanrieder, ‘Actor Objectives and International 
Systems’, Journal of Politics, 27:1 (1966), pp. 109-32. 
41 Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998), p. 25.  
42 Matt McDonald, ‘Securitization and the Construction of Security’, European Journal of 
International Relations, 14:4 (2008), p.572.  
43 Wæver cited in Paul Roe, ‘Is Securitization a “Negative” Concept?  Revisiting the 
Normative Debate over Normal Versus Extraordinary Politics’, Security Dialogue, 43:3 
(2012)  p.255.  
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interaction: repeated bargaining procedures and substantive exchanges between a 
security actor (the organization) and its audience (the organization’s constituent 
members) over the content and form of threats as well as the policy responses 
appropriate to mitigating them. In collective securitization this means the audience 
takes on a particular form and meaning; it is not external to the securitizing actor but 
constitutive of it. Second, an active understanding of audience helps explain policy 
choice: why some issues (and not others) are securitized and, thus, why certain policies 
are formulated in response.44 The outcome here remains dependent on the balance of 
positional power between actor and audience. In a national setting the former will 
always have an advantage (even in democracies) given its association with government 
and access to the resources of the state. The latter (whether defined as public opinion, 
the electorate, political elites, or interested minorities) will be more constrained in its 
ability to mobilize political resources. Collective securitization (particularly in the 
military sector) gives rise, however, to a quite different dynamic: the empowering 
audience is itself comprised of states and the securitizing actor (i.e. NATO) does not 
enjoy default positional power. Such a dynamic affirms the need to take the role of 
audience, and recursive interaction, seriously.   
 
Amendments to Securitization Theory 
Notwithstanding the departure from state-centrism noted above, ST has been 
concerned largely with tracing the mechanisms and consequences of securitization 
                                                     
44 Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert, ‘Reconceptualizing the Audience in 
Securitization Theory’, in Thierry Balzacq (ed), Securitization Theory: How Security 
Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), pp.57-76.  
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within and by states. With the exception of Jürgen Haacke and Paul Williams45 (to whom 
we return below) there has been no systematic effort to apply ST to relations among 
states in a process of collective securitization. Five amendments to ST are necessary to 
support such an approach, rendering it relevant to NATO (and, by extension, to other 
regional security organizations).  
A first amendment centres on the need to differentiate between private and 
public security goods. ST assumes that security is, in effect, a private good, subject to a 
national policy programme with national repercussions, even in those cases where the 
securitized threat is transnational, for example terrorism or a communicable disease. 
Although Buzan and Wæver’s understanding of ‘macrosecuritization’ suggests that 
securitization does not stop at the water’s edge,46 ST has paid too little attention to the 
problem of how system-level, public goods are securitized.  The necessary shift of focus 
here would see securitization as the outcome of a shared threat perception across states 
followed by agreement on the appropriate policy response. International organizations 
(and regional security organizations specifically) are the obvious framework within 
which to observe this process. This contention may lack purchase in many regions of the 
world.  However, in the densely institutionalized European and transatlantic security 
space, it is persuasive both conceptually and empirically.   
                                                     
45 Jürgen Haacke and Paul D. Williams, ‘Regional Arrangements, Securitization, and 
Transnational Security Challenges:  the African Union and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations Compared’, Security Studies, 17:4 (2008), pp. 775-809. 
46 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, ‘Macrosecuritization and Security Constellations: 
Reconsidering Scale in Securitization Theory’, Review of International Studies, 35:2 
(2009), pp. 253-276.  
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Even if we accept that NATO is an important actor in this space, a second 
amendment becomes necessary.  This relates to the notion of agency. ST risks 
essentializing the security actor, a potential problem if NATO is regarded as a unitary 
actor or agent of securitization.  To avoid this, our previous observations on the role of 
audience are relevant but need extending. Recursive interaction we suggested involves 
both the securitizing actor (the organization) and its members (who constitute the 
audience), but recognition needs to be given to the fact that members may be so 
powerful as to blur the actor-audience distinction. Indeed, within a strictly inter-
governmental body such as NATO only members have the power to validate a 
securitization move and the policies that flow from it, and certain members (in NATO’s 
case, the US) may exert a decisive influence. This need not, however, render security 
organizations mere ciphers for the ‘atomistic pursuit’ of individual member interests.47 
NATO, specifically, is the repository of a common strategic language as well as a set of 
practices and norms built up over decades. NATO aggregates material power but also 
embodies symbolic power, assuming in its own right an authority to speak and act in 
the security field. By this view, there is no neat distinction between the organization and 
its membership. Those inside organizations, Michael C. Williams has suggested, ‘must 
work within the parameters of the prevailing institutional form […] organizations wield 
power over their members, but it is a power which these members will upon 
themselves.’48 Applied to ST this insight suggests that individual allies can initiate a 
demand for securitization, but it is the Alliance which renders the securitization process 
                                                     
47 Michael C. Williams, Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of 
International Security (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), p.68.  
48 Williams (2007), p.65.  
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authoritative by providing a common language and set of policies. NATO’s significance 
in securitization can, therefore, only be understood if a priori we regard it as a site of 
recursive interaction where the Alliance is simultaneously a securitizing actor and a 
framework of audience participation.    
A third amendment stems from the assertion inherent in ST that a threat, to be 
regarded as such, must endanger the integrity of the referent object  – hence, the 
standard CS definition that threats are ‘existential’ in nature. The integrity of the state as 
referent is too narrow a means of thinking about securitization, however. States assess 
their security with an eye to how their concerns are shared with others – and so, the 
referent object can take an organizational form (as in an alliance).  Securitization is also 
conditioned by a broader institutional context. In densely institutionalized security 
spaces, well-developed rules and norms regulate inter-state interactions, frame 
appropriate mechanisms of conflict resolution, and ensure compliance with issue 
specific regimes, treaties and law.49 A necessary amendment for a theory of collective 
securitization, therefore, is to give due weight to instances when this institutional 
context is itself undermined. The breaking of rules (a violation of the principle of 
territorial integrity, for example) challenges not just the specific arena in which the 
action occurs, but the broader edifice of international order, or governance, of which it 
is part.  Collective securitization, in short, reflects a layering of referent objects: state, 
international organization and international order.  
This amendment to how threats are securitized requires (and this is our fourth 
amendment) a concomitant consideration of how measures are taken in response. Two 
                                                     
49 James Sperling and Mark Webber, ‘Security Governance in Europe: A Return to 
System’, European Security, 23:2 (2014), pp. 126-144.  
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points are worth making here. The first is to go beyond the CS’s emphasis on the speech 
act. As Rita Floyd has pointed out, the securitizing move and its acceptance by the 
audience is only part of what constitutes securitization. To the performative act of 
speech it is necessary to add the practical one of policy.50  Second, in accepting that 
policy matters, emergency ought not be the defining criterion of securitization.  A 
securitized issue (immigration for instance) can become routinized in domestic policy. 
And that state of affairs is just as relevant when applied to collective securitization. An 
international organization such as NATO enjoys precisely the legal and political 
authority (through its founding treaty and, on occasion, UN Security Council 
Resolutions) to initiate military measures when called upon; it is part of its modus 
operandi, not an exception to it.  
A fifth and final amendment relates to the largely absent concept of 
resecuritization.  Desecuritization, as already noted, entails the removal (or 
downgrading) of an issue from the security agenda. Equally, it might involve a mutual 
willingness to alter the terms of an adversarial relationship. Re-securitization is 
effectively a unilateral process that can be initiated by either party to such a 
desecuritization effort. Resecuritization has not featured prominently in ST, but is 
distinct from the process of securitization owing to the presence of a number of factors, 
foremost among them the existence of a ready-made security grammar, or set of ‘master 
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signifiers’ that make it easier for an actor to initiate a resecuritization move and to 
encourage an audience to accept it without reservation.51   
 
Collective securitization.   
Haacke and Williams were the first to explore collective securitization.  They conceive of 
it as occurring when ‘one or more securitizing actors within [a regional] arrangement 
identif[ies] a particular development or issue as an existential threat to a security 
referent.’52 Their analysis assumes that a state will initiate a securitizing move that will 
then be generalized within a regional arrangement or organization. There is no 
assumption here that the organization possesses the authority necessary to initiate this 
move itself or that it engages in a recursive interaction with its members. The 
organization is little more than a site of bargaining between its member states.  Our 
focus, by contrast, is the role of regional security organizations as both a site and agent 
of collective securitization. Building on the amendments to ST in the previous section, 
we see such a role as plausible when an international organization is possessed of legal 
and political authority, has agenda-setting powers, is the framework for formulating 
and implementing common policies, and is the repository of a common security 
narrative.  Collective securitization, meanwhile, is most likely when a threat is posed to 
a public security good (shared material interests or commonly-held rules and norms).  
Set out as a model, there are six distinct stages in the process of collective 
securitization by a regional security organization (see Figure 1). The first stage 
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represents the status quo security discourse and concomitant policies premised upon 
received notions of threat. The second is constituted by a precipitating event (or inter-
related series of events) of gravity sufficient to disrupt this status quo and prompt a 
perception by the securitizing actor (and its audience) that the qualitative character of 
the external security environment has altered for the worse.  
 
(Figure 1 here. A Model of Collective Securitization.) 
 
 The third and fourth stages - the securitizing move and audience response - are 
separated analytically but are co-dependent through the process of recursive 
interaction.   The precipitating event initiates the securitizing move. For a theory of 
collective securitization it is necessary to show how such a move is detectable first at 
the collective level. Hence, the third stage isolates collective expressions of threat even if 
we accept that these are not entirely autonomous of the audience to which they are 
directed and which facilitate their generation. The securitizing (or resecuritizing) move 
will take the form of a speech act, which, in NATO’s case, will consist of statements by 
authoritative actors, including the Secretary General, the SACEUR, the Chair of the 
Military Committee and others. These figures act in NATO’s name but bring with them 
other institutional preferences (the SACEUR, for instance, is also head of US European 
Command). Greater authority, therefore, resides in statements endorsed by the 
membership, most authoritatively at ministerial or head of state and government level. 
Such statements express the will of the Alliance and epitomize recursive interaction 
among NATO members as well as between those members and the NATO 
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bureaucracy.53 The speech act signifies the presence of a threat to a referent object (i.e. 
NATO itself) and to the systemic properties which sustain it (i.e. international norms 
and a preferred international order). The speech act is thus replete with allusions to 
how that order has been subverted (and who is to blame) and how this degrades 
NATO’s own sense of security. A regional security institution can only act as a 
securitizing actor if the member states grant it the legal and political authority to do so 
and if it represents ‘normal politics’ within the institution.  The fourth stage of the 
process is thus the empowering audience’s involvement in the securitizing move and 
validation of it. 
The next two stages in the collective securitization process revolve around the 
formulation and execution of policies which address the securitized threat. Consistent 
with the position staked out earlier, successful collective securitization occurs when a 
securitizing actor obtains audience acceptance, and consequent adoption, of 
appropriate common policies. The final stage of collective securitization, meanwhile, is 
the routinization of the amended or new strategic vocabulary, agenda and practice. A 
disrupted external environment gives rise to a new status quo meaning this final stage 
                                                     
53  That interaction can be demonstrated empirically. According to Jamie Shea, Deputy 
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subsequently circulated to, and negotiated by, Allies in meetings chaired by staff from 
the IS. 
 
25 
 
effectively becomes a new stage one of a future securitization process.    
While the process of collective securitization unfolds sequentially, we 
nonetheless depart from the ‘decisionistic’ bias of the CS which sees securitization as 
occurring at specific moments in time.54 For us, the stages in this sequence are 
overlapping rather than separate. A precipitating event can occur in one compelling and 
concentrated moment, but its consequences are felt over an extended period; other 
related events, furthermore, may follow and reinforce it. The upshot is that the 
discourse of threat runs in parallel with (not simply in reaction to) the events it is 
narrating. That discourse will also run alongside policy (discourse does not cease once a 
relevant policy is initiated). Further, the stages of securitization need not be seen as 
occurring ex nihilo. A precipitating event may occur of such suddenness as to be truly 
without parallel (the 9/11 attacks, for instance) but it may also be the culmination of a 
manifest trend.  The issue here then becomes one of scale as much as of surprise - with 
the event confirming in dramatic form an already known and emerging threat.  By the 
same token, the securitizing move may be a repeat of a previous sequence – a 
resecuritization in other words.  
 In the following section the model of collective securitization is given empirical 
content. Models can have many purposes.  That used here serves an ‘explicative 
function’, by which the model in question ‘explores the putative causal mechanisms 
underlying phenomena of interest.’55 To that end, the data we present is intended to 
show how and why NATO resecuritized Russia. We are aware that not all statements 
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emanating from NATO’s members states conform to the securitizing narrative. By 
excluding these we are open to the charge of underplaying contingency and 
contestation while, at the same time, overplaying consistency and coherence.   Our 
approach is, nonetheless, sound for two reasons. The first relates to the nature of 
models themselves. Models in the social sciences are meant to be a representation of 
reality not its faithful reproduction. They aim, following Patrick Jackson, ‘not to capture 
the whole of actuality, but instead to help […] bring some analytical order to our 
experiences.’56 A model needs to ‘fit the facts’ but not every fact needs to fit the model.57 
The second reason relates to the nature of NATO. While stubbornly inter-governmental 
(reflective, therefore, of a variety of views), it is also the consensus-based organization 
par excellence. Its statements once agreed are thus expressive of a meaningful and 
authoritative organizational voice.   
 
 
NATO and the Collective (Re)securitization of the Russian Federation.   
We now turn to NATO’s role as an agent of collective securitization utilizing the six 
stages just outlined. The context is the events prior to, and then consequent upon, 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014. From that point onward, NATO 
articulated an explicit discourse of threat and adopted a raft of measures in response.  
Securitization then ran in parallel with the extension of the Ukrainian crisis as war 
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erupted in the east of the country. That conflict reached a stalemate by the autumn of 
2015; even so, concerns over Russia continued to preoccupy NATO. Taking our case up 
to NATO’s Warsaw summit in July 2016, it becomes clear that the securitization of 
Russia had become routine within NATO.  
 
Status quo security discourse and policy  
During the Cold War, NATO subjected the Soviet Union (Russia’s predecessor) and the 
Warsaw Pact to a sustained securitization process.  The qualifications of détente and the 
systemic stability of bipolarity notwithstanding, the view dominant within the Alliance 
was that its fundamental purpose was to deter Soviet aggression.  The material evidence 
for this lay, first, in NATO’s military organization (along with attendant strategic and 
doctrinal assumptions) and, second, in the minimal role NATO played in contingencies 
not involving the Soviet bloc (hence, the absence of an ‘out-of-area’ role).58 Importantly, 
evidence also existed in NATO discourse. During the Cold War, the Alliance adopted four 
authoritative Strategic Concepts (in 1949, 1952, 1957 and 1968) all of which identified 
the Soviet Union as a threat.59 These documents were classified, but publically-available 
statements conveyed an identical point. The Report of the Committee of Three of 1956 
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pointed out that NATO’s formation had resulted from ‘the fear of military aggression by 
the forces of the USSR and its allies.’60 The 1974 Ottawa Declaration noted that ‘the 
nature of the danger’ posed by the Soviet Union had changed but that the members of 
the Alliance ‘remain[ed] vulnerable to attack.’61 Ten years on, a NATO statement on 
East-West relations stated that ‘a massive [Soviet] military build-up’ posed ‘a continuing 
threat to Alliance security and vital Western interests.’62 NATO did not take the view 
that a Soviet attack would happen at any minute, but the threat was regarded as both 
substantive (the military strategy of the Warsaw Pact was directed at fighting NATO) 
and severe (in Europe, Warsaw Pact capabilities exceeded those of NATO).  
 NATO’s military concerns were underpinned by a systemic referent in that the 
Soviet Union was seen as exemplifying a form of social, political and economic 
organization utterly at odds with the value system of ‘the West.’63 An end to the Cold 
War thus only became possible once this fundamental incompatibility was resolved. The 
changes when they did come were profound (the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the 
unification of Germany within NATO and, ultimately, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
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itself) and led NATO to desecuritize the Soviet Union in two senses. First ‘a non-
adversarial and cooperative relationship’ was seen to be in the offing. Second, and 
connected, that relationship was posited as being outside of the realm of mutual 
insecurity.64  These assumptions were transferred to Russia as the continuing state of 
the Soviet Union and up until the Ukraine crisis an assumption of partnership 
constituted the post-Cold War status quo. This was evident in three regards: the 
privileged status accorded to Russia by NATO, practical interaction between the two 
sides, and NATO’s changed strategic posture.  
 On the first point, NATO’s post-Cold War Strategic Concepts refer to Russia in 
positive terms: as the component of a ‘strong, stable and enduring partnership’ 
according to the 1999 document, and of a ‘strong and constructive partnership’ 
according to that of 2010.65 Partnership with Russia, furthermore, was seen as distinct 
from the many other relationships NATO developed during this period. Russia, the 1997 
Founding Act on Mutual Relations noted, stood alongside the Alliance in building ‘a 
lasting and inclusive peace in the Euro-Atlantic area’ (a phrase subsequently repeated in 
the NATO-Russia 2002 Rome Declaration).66 Such language did not go without 
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qualification.  Throughout the 2000s, NATO communiqués referred with increasing 
regularity to specific issues of concern and, in the case of Russia’s intervention in 
Georgia, to major differences of principle.67  NATO was also unresponsive to suggestions 
in Moscow that Russia be admitted to the Alliance, that NATO be subordinated to a new 
pan-European security arrangement and that formal relations be established with the 
Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization.68 These qualifications ran in parallel, 
however, with an ongoing claim  that, in the words of the 2012 Chicago summit 
declaration, ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia still mattered for ‘creating a common 
space of peace, stability and security’ in Europe.69  
 As for practical cooperation, this was hardly extensive. It was also subject to 
periodic interruption (Russia broke off contacts in the wake of NATO’s intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999, and relations were mutually curtailed in the wake of the Russo-
                                                                                                                                                                     
_texts_25468.htm}; ‘NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality’ (28 May 2002), available at: 
{www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official _texts_19572.htm}. 
67 ‘Statement: Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Level of Foreign Ministers’ 
(19 August 2008), available at: {www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_ 
29950.htm}.  
68 David Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace 
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Georgian war). Yet periods of downtime were matched by equally significant uptakes.70 
The break over Kosovo was set aside by increased cooperation after 9/11, while the 
rupture over Georgia underwent repair after NATO’s 2010 Lisbon summit (Russia 
cooperated with the ISASF mission in Afghanistan by allowing it access to the Northern 
Distribution Network and abstained on two crucial votes in the U.N. Security Council in 
early 2011 thus facilitating Operation Unified Protector, NATO’s mission in Libya).  
 NATO’s strategic posture also reflected an investment in partnership with 
Russia. While the Alliance retained collective defence as a core mission, this was 
reconceived to encompass terrorism, cyber warfare and WMD proliferation – 
contingencies not necessarily made with Russia in mind.71  Indeed, NATO went to some 
lengths not to take measures against Russia. The Founding Act indicated that NATO 
would refrain from stationing nuclear weapons or ‘additional permanent [… and] 
substantial combat forces’ on the territory of new members.72 Following the 
enlargements of 1999 and 2004, NATO thus avoided providing reinforcement 
capabilities to the east European allies and it was not until 2010 that the Alliance began 
contingency planning for the defence of the Baltic states. Throughout the 2000s, NATO 
was, in fact, preoccupied with force projection out-of-area. Its signature mission, ISAF, 
was in Afghanistan, its most symbolic military innovation was the NATO Response 
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Force (NRF)73 and its most noteworthy statement of purpose (the 2006 Comprehensive 
Political Guidance) placed ‘unpredictable challenges […] far from member states’ 
borders’ on a par with collective defence.74 At the 2012 Chicago summit, NATO 
considered itself satisfied with its ‘existing mix of [military] capabilities’,75 and gave the 
impression that Russia was not of pressing concern.76  
 
The precipitating event   
The details of the Ukraine crisis are well-known and need not be repeated at length 
here.77 Ukraine had experienced political turmoil over several years, particularly 
following the ‘Orange Revolution’ which saw the coming to power of a reformist 
government under President Viktor Yushchenko in January 2005. Yushchenko was 
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replaced, in turn, by Viktor Yanukovych in February 2010, a president whose decision in 
late 2013 to forge closer ties with Russia rather than sign an Association Agreement 
with the EU sparked the Euromaiden protests in Kiev.  This volte face triggered 
escalating violence that culminated in February 2014 with Yanukovych’s removal from 
office. Two sets of events then followed which marked a significant deterioration of the 
situation.   
 The first concerned Crimea, an autonomous republic within Ukraine with a 
majority ethnic Russian population. During March 2014, Russia effectively annexed the 
territory against a backdrop of destabilization by pro-Russian militias. The formal 
process entailed a referendum in Crimea on union with the Russian Federation, a treaty 
of accession signed by the Crimean authorities and the Russian president, and that 
treaty’s ratification by the Russian parliament.  
 The second set of events occurred in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine 
immediately after the Crimea episode.   Here, armed militias of the self-declared 
republics of Donetsk and Luhansk seized territory and strategic locations. This 
prompted a counter-offensive by Ukrainian forces and then a series of battles of 
increasing severity. Rebel advances in Ukraine’s south-east were such that by August 
the prospect loomed of a land corridor being established with Crimea. A ceasefire 
agreed in September (the Minsk Agreement) forestalled it.  That agreement was 
subsequently violated but a further text was concluded in February 2015 (Minsk II).  
This second agreement reduced but did not halt the fighting; it also failed to bring a 
political settlement any closer. 
 There were many notable aspects of this twin crisis although it was the events of 
Crimea that presented the most far-reaching challenge to international order, despite 
the greater human toll of the conflict in eastern Ukraine.  As Thomas Grant notes, the 
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Russian action represented ‘the first formal act of annexation following the use and 
threat of force against a state in Europe since 1945.’ Parallels are few: Crimea was 
unlike the partition of Cyprus in 1974 (the Turkish north declared independence but 
was not incorporated into Turkey proper) as well as Russia’s recognition of the 
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the 2008 Georgia war (Russia 
absorbed neither into the Federation).  According to Grant, the only post-War 
comparison is ‘Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait’; both involved one UN member 
acting against another with the aim of ‘eradicating an international boundary’ and 
seizing territory.78 The Russian government saw matters rather differently and 
mounted an elaborate legal defence of Crimea’s change of status.79 Its arguments were 
dismissed, however, whenever put before an international forum. In mid-March 2014, a 
draft Security Council resolution rejecting the referendum in Crimea was supported by 
13 of the Council’s 15 members (China abstained and Russia exercised its veto). A vote 
before the General Assembly later that month upholding Ukraine’s territorial integrity 
was supported by 100 members with 11 against and 58 abstaining. The Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, meanwhile, passed resolutions on three separate 
occasions (April 2014, January 2015 and June 2015) condemning the ‘illegal annexation 
of Crimea.’80  
 Roy Allison has described Russia’s annexation of Crimea as ‘an affront to the core 
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principles of contemporary interstate conduct’ thereby raising ‘the question [of] 
whether Putin is mounting a wider challenge to what he regards as a western-
dominated international system and legal order.’81 Attending to that question is a 
matter of controversy because some influential observers have viewed Russian 
behavior as an understandable reaction to NATO (and EU) influence building in and 
around Ukraine.82 What matters in the current discussion, however, is not a value 
judgment on Russian actions but a sense of how its conduct has provided a pretext for 
(re)securitization. In this sense, the legal context (noted above) matters, as do two other 
significant aspects of the Ukraine crisis.  
 The first is its obvious military character. While Moscow maintained a narrative 
of deniability, it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that Russian armed formations took 
up position on the Russo-Ukrainian frontier, provided the separatists with sophisticated 
military equipment (including surface-to-air missiles, one of which downed a Malaysia 
Airlines flight in July 2014), and sent military advisers to the conflict zones. Russian 
troop detachments and special forces also intervened directly on the battlefield at key 
points (the second battle for Donetsk airport in September 2014 and for Debaltseve in 
February 2015 being the most significant).83 Beyond the Ukrainian theatre, meanwhile, 
Russia undertook several shows of strength. The Russian navy and air force increased 
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their activities in the Baltic region, the high north and the North and Black Seas 
(resulting in numerous infringements of NATO air and maritime space  as well as that of 
Sweden and Finland),84 increased the scale and tempo of military exercises (some 
premised on war with NATO’s northern members), and engaged in nuclear signaling 
(with President Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov both alluding to the strategic 
importance of Russia’s nuclear capability).85  
 The second aspect of note concerns Russia’s claims to propriety around its 
borders along with accompanying anti-NATO sentiment. As the Ukraine crisis unfolded, 
Putin suggested that Crimea’s union with Russia was necessary to prevent the territory 
falling into NATO’s hands in the event of Ukrainian accession to the Alliance.86 The 
Ukraine crisis, he suggested in September 2014, was ‘engineered […] by certain of our 
western partners’ with the aim of ‘reinvigorating’ the NATO ‘military bloc.’87 In this vein, 
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Putin would go on to suggest that the Ukrainian army was ‘a NATO foreign legion’ 
motivated by ‘the geopolitical aim of containing Russia.’88  
 
The (re)securitizing move  
Prior to the annexation of Crimea, the Alliance had expressed concern at the 
deteriorating political situation in Ukraine but had refrained from identifying events in 
the country as in any sense threatening.89  From March 2014, however, the focus 
shifted. Russian action was not only a violation of Ukrainian sovereignty but also 
‘challenged’ the stability of the Euro-Atlantic region, contravened international law, and 
‘gravely breached the trust upon which cooperation’ with NATO had been premised.90 
The then NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen suggested that Crimea was a 
‘game-changer’ for NATO and concluded in late March that ‘we live in a different world 
than we did less than a month ago.’91 Russia’s ‘present path of aggression, confrontation 
and escalation’, Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow declared, meant that it 
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was now ‘less of a partner and more of an adversary.’92 
 The war in eastern Ukraine reinforced this perspective. In the face of 
protestations in Moscow, NATO charged Russia with a ‘continued and deliberate 
destabilization’ of the region.93 NATO’s Wales summit of September 2014 concluded 
that Russian action had undone efforts at partnership stretching back over two 
decades,94 while incoming Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg described it as a 
‘challenge to the international order we have built since the fall of the Berlin Wall.’95 The 
Minsk II agreement de-escalated fighting in eastern Ukraine, but ‘Russia’, NATO Defence 
Ministers declared in June 2015, continued to challenge ‘Euro-Atlantic security through 
military action, coercion and intimidation of its neighbours.’96 Speaking in November 
2015, Vershbow accused Russia of ripping ‘up the international rule book’ and plunging 
relations with NATO ‘to their lowest point in decades.’97  
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 This concern for international order had a particular focus. Ukraine’s fate was 
viewed as a possible precursor to a Russian assault on neighbouring countries, 
particularly Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan,98 and more worryingly on 
NATO’s own Baltic member states.99 In light of what a NATO discussion document 
referred to as ‘Russia’s multiple naval and airspace incursions in the Nordic-Baltic 
region’,100 so Alliance officials held out the possibility of NATO being caught unprepared 
by Russia. According to the Deputy SACEUR, Sir Adrian Bradshaw, Russian conventional 
forces could be deployed ‘not only for intimidation and coercion but potentially to seize 
NATO territory’; the attendant danger of war, ‘however unlikely’ was, nonetheless, ‘an 
existential threat to our whole being.’101  
 Over the two-year period surveyed here, NATO officials went to great lengths to 
detail (often with the help of photographic and satellite imagery) the destabilization of 
Ukraine.  Here, as the SACEUR General Philip Breedlove suggested in July 2014, Russia 
was employing covert military tactics as well as ‘the most amazing information warfare 
blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare.’  These methods of 
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‘hybrid war’ posed particular problems for the Alliance (fuzzy attribution, escalation by 
stealth and the need to combine military and civilian instruments in response) all of 
which required NATO to rethink how it defended its eastern flank.102 Breedlove would 
repeat these points more than a year later, describing Russia as ‘aggressive and coercive 
in [its] use of diplomatic, military and economic tools.’103 Comparison of two keynote 
NATO documents show just how significant was this shift in language. Hybrid warfare 
barely merited mention in NATO’s 2013 Strategic Foresight Analysis. It loomed large, 
however, in the 2015 successor, Framework for Future Alliance Operations. The latter 
included among its threat scenarios a conflict ‘in the Euro-Atlantic region’ involving 
‘hybrid actors’, ‘expansionism at NATO’s borders’, ‘internal instability of a NATO 
member’ and a ‘large-scale insurgency within the Alliance’ – events all based on how the 
experience of Ukraine might transfer to NATO’s eastern members.104  Hybrid tactics 
were not NATO’s only concern. Russia’s militarization of Crimea extended Russian anti-
access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the Black Sea thereby enhancing its 
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ability to interfere with NATO aerial and naval forces and so escalating tensions with 
Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey,  NATO’s littoral states in the region.105  
  
Audience response 
NATO’s securitizing audience, as argued above, is its member states. As states, they are 
not passive recipients of the securitizing move; in a process of recursive interaction 
they are also responsible for its generation. Empirically, therefore, the speech acts of 
NATO’s members will approximate those issued in the name of the Alliance. Such an 
understanding does not require that all members are equally vocal or that there is a 
uniformity of views – we would expect NATO’s eastern members, understandably, to be 
more concerned with Russian action than its southern ones.  That said, the Baltic States 
and Poland are excluded from the analysis for even before the Ukraine crisis, they had 
securitized Russia without effect on NATO policy.106 What is more important in the 
present context is how NATO’s most influential states (the US, the UK, Germany and 
France), where such securitization was not so evident, moved toward a language of 
threat.  
                                                     
105 Vershbow interview with Defence Matters, 5 November 2015, available at: 
{http://defencematters.org/news/vershbow-nato-needs-strategy-to-address-threats-
from-the-south-and-the-east/410/}. 
106 M.Mälskoo and Margarita Šešelgyte, ‘Reinventing “New” Europe: Baltic Perspectives 
on Transatlantic Security Reconfigurations’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 
46:3 (2013), pp.397-406; Kerry Longhurst, ‘Where From, Where To? New and Old 
Configurations in Poland’s Foreign and Security Policies’, Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, 46:3 (2013), pp.363-372.  
42 
 
 In the case of the US, relations with Russia prior to the Ukraine crisis were 
comparable to the oscillations of the broader NATO-Russia relationship. Major 
disagreements repeatedly challenged the rhetorical commitment to partnership. Some 
issues overlapped with Alliance concerns (Kosovo, enlargement, missile defence, the 
Russia-Georgia war), whereas others played out bilaterally (Iran, Russian nuclear 
capabilities, the Edward Snowdon affair). Nonetheless, during both the Clinton and 
Bush administrations Russia was not positioned explicitly as a threat to American vital 
interests or to those of NATO. The Obama administration’s effort to ‘reset’ relations with 
Russia during its first term replicated this pattern.107 Into the second term, that outlook 
persisted - at a summit meeting with Putin in June 2013, Obama referred to the ongoing 
possibilities of a ‘constructive, cooperative relationship that moves us out of a Cold War 
mindset.’108 
 The Ukraine crisis, however, resulted in a distinct shift of emphasis. Here, 
according to one Pentagon official, Russia had demonstrated ‘a very sophisticated 
capacity for asymmetric, unattributed aggression.’109 Russia’s ‘alarming’ behavior in 
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Ukraine, incoming Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford claimed in July 2015, 
had endangered NATO’s eastern borders. Dunford also used the pretext of Ukraine to 
focus attention on Russia’s military, and particularly nuclear, capabilities. These, he 
argued, presented the ‘greatest threat to (US) national security’, indeed an ‘existential’ 
one.110 The 2015 National Military Strategy prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was 
more measured (Russia was not ‘seeking a direct military conflict with the United States 
or its allies’). It noted, nonetheless, that ‘Russia’s military actions’ were ‘undermining 
regional security’ and that Russia was ‘acting in a manner that threatens [America’s] 
national security interests.’111  Senior administration figures shared some of these 
concerns. President Obama, while holding out hope of Russian participation in a 
diplomatic solution, took the view that Russia had challenged ‘the most basic principles 
of our international order’ (he referred to the annexation of Crimea as an ‘invasion of 
Ukraine’), had encouraged ‘violent separatists’ in eastern Ukraine, and was complicit in 
the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight 17.112    
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 Official British views of Russia mirrored those of the US. Bilateral relations had 
been troubled well before the Ukraine crisis (over issues such as Litvinenko affair) and 
the UK was a prominent critic of Russian action against Georgia in 2008. British officials, 
however, retained a language of cooperation, evident as late as March 2013 in the 
launch of a new UK-Russia Strategic Dialogue. The Crimea crisis prompted a change of 
direction. Prime Minister David Cameron described Russian action as a ‘flagrant breach 
of international law’; an action with (unspecified) consequences for the UK as ‘Britain’s 
own future depends on a world where countries obey the rules.’113 Defence Secretary 
Phillip Hammond argued that Russia was ‘very significantly misaligned with the 
interests of ourselves and our western allies.’114 His successor Michael Fallon would 
subsequently suggest that Russia was now ‘as much a threat to Europe as Islamic State’; 
it posed ‘a real and present danger’ to the Baltic States and, by extension, was ‘testing 
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NATO.’115  ‘Russia’, a keynote UK government statement declared in November 2015, 
‘has become more aggressive, authoritarian and nationalist [… willing] to undermine 
wider international standards of cooperation in order to secure its perceived 
interests.’116 
 The German and French positions were more circumscribed, a consequence of 
the direct involvement of Berlin and Paris in diplomatic efforts to contain the crisis. A 
sense of threat nonetheless emerged.  Russian action, German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
suggested in November 2014, called ‘the entire European peaceful order into question’ 
with possible repercussions for Moldova, Georgia and even Serbia and the western 
Balkans.117 Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble stated that Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea was comparable to the Nazi occupation of the Sudetenland.118 Even the more 
diplomatically-inclined Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier charged Russia with 
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‘flouting the central foundations of the peaceful order in Europe.’119   The French 
position was similar. Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius argued at the 2015 Munich 
Security Conference that ‘[s]ecurity on the European continent today’ had been defined 
by events in Ukraine with Europe now divided between ‘a country with huge military 
capabilities […] which does not act according to […] the core principles’ of international 
order ‘and a community of states committed to the rule of law and eschewing the ‘use of 
military means as a preferred option’ of policy.120 President Francois Hollande, 
meanwhile, argued that Ukraine’s territorial integrity was ‘non-negotiable’ and that 
Russian designs on Crimea posed a broader problem – ‘[t]here are lot of countries 
which could get worried if a precedent were set for breaching borders and territorial 
integrity.’121  
 
Policy output  
Successful securitization requires a response to the securitizing move (the speech act) 
one that revises policies previously pursued toward the (re)securitized source of threat. 
NATO responded immediately to the annexation of Crimea by suspending ‘all practical 
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civilian and military cooperation’ with Russia.122 It had done the same over the 2008 
Russian-Georgian war but the Ukraine case marked a much more decisive break, for 
here sustained follow-on measures were pursued. These fall into two categories, 
defined by NATO as ‘assurance’ and ‘adaptation’.  Both were consolidated within the 
Readiness Action Plan (RAP) approved at the Wales summit, in turn, underpinned by a 
common commitment to increase allies’ defence spending.123  
 Assurance commenced as early as mid-March 2014 with increased NATO AWAC 
flights over Poland and Romania. In mid-April, agreement was reached on air policing 
over the Baltic States, maritime patrols in the Baltic Sea and eastern Mediterranean, a 
review of NATO ‘defence plans’ and the preparation of a greater number of exercises.124 
These measures were not new as such - NATO had, for example, initiated the Baltic air 
policing mission in 2004. What was notable was the scaling-up of the activity: the 
number of aerial and maritime patrols was increased as was the number of 
participating allies.125 Similarly, NATO having in 2012 already shifted the purpose of its 
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exercises toward collective defence took that process a significant step further. During 
the course of 2014, the Alliance mounted 162 exercises (double the number originally 
scheduled) and in 2015 some 280, half of which were ‘dedicated to Assurance Measures 
in the [e]astern part of NATO.’126 2015 also saw the largest NATO exercise for a decade 
(Trident Juncture), the largest ever NATO exercise in the Baltic Sea (BALTOPS 2015) 
and the biggest anti-submarine warfare exercise ever mounted by the Alliance 
(Dynamic Mongoose). Through 2016 the pace and scale of exercises was maintained: 
Operation Anakonda, a Polish-led national exercise held in June, was the biggest field 
exercise mounted by NATO allies in eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War.  
  As for adaptation, the key measure here has been a reinvigoration of the NRF. 
Following agreement in principle at the Wales summit, more forces were made 
available (from 13,000 to a projected 40,000) and a new ‘spearhead’ component created  
- the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). This was supplemented by the 
establishment (from September 2015) of seven new multinational headquarters (so-
called NATO Force Integration Units) in the Baltics and eastern Europe, an enhancement 
of Headquarters Multinational Corps Northeast (in Szczecin Poland) and the creation of 
a new Divisional Headquarters Southeast in Romania as well as a Standing Joint 
Logistics Headquarters within the Alliance command structure.127 NATO Defence 
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Ministers in February 2016 agreed on ‘an enhanced forward presence in the eastern 
part of […] the Alliance,’128 and in June to station four multi-national battalions in 
Poland and the Baltic states. Additionally, NATO’s Warsaw summit the following month 
announced plans to develop a ‘tailored forward presence’ in Romania and the Black Sea 
region.129 Individual allies took measures in support. Most significantly, the US through 
Operation Atlantic Resolve (and its main funding instrument, the European Reassurance 
Initiative) increased its commitment to training, exercises, military construction, and 
rotational troop presence in NATO’s eastern allies. It also provided ‘enabling 
capabilities’ for the VJTF and augmented the pre-positioning of equipment in the Baltic 
States, Poland, Romania, Germany and Bulgaria.130 At Warsaw, the US along with 
Canada, the UK and Germany agreed to serve as framework nations for the NATO build 
up in the Baltics and Poland.    
 NATO which, prior to 2014, had been mainly concerned with expeditionary and 
out-of-area contingencies was, Defence Ministers concluded in mid-2015, undertaking a 
‘far-reaching adaptation of [its] military strategic posture […] with a renewed emphasis 
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on deterrence and collective defence capabilities.’131 This was, Secretary General 
Stoltenberg pointed out, ‘the biggest reinforcement of [NATO] collective defence since 
the end of the Cold War.’132 In less diplomatic language, Deputy Secretary General 
Alexander Vershbow noted in October 2015, ‘[w]e want to deter Russia from even 
thinking of messing with us.’133 
 
The new security status quo  
Secretary General Stoltenberg noted in December 2015 that the ‘[c]hallenges posed by 
Russia’s actions in the Euro-Atlantic area will be with us for a long time.’134 SACUER 
General Breedlove has suggested similarly that ‘[t]he Russia problem set is not going 
away’. Some two years after the Crimea crisis, ‘a resurgent aggressive Russia’ had 
enforced ‘a permanent redrawing of sovereign boundaries in Europe’, posed ‘an ongoing 
challenge to Western efforts aimed at assuring […] NATO allies’ in the Baltics and so 
constituted a ‘long-term existential threat’ to NATO.135  Notwithstanding the challenge 
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of Russia, a debate has emerged within the Alliance, consequent upon the rise of ISIS 
and the war in Syria, on the need to rebalance to NATO’s  south.136 As NATO prepared 
for its July 2016 summit in Warsaw, NATO’s eastern and southern flanks were both 
enveloped within what Deputy Secretary General Vershbow referred to as a 
‘comprehensive, 360 degree approach [… to] threats.’137  The evidence to date, however, 
is that instability in the Middle East and North Africa has been insufficient to initiate a 
new NATO-framed securitization, one in which a narrative of threat is translated into 
policy. Indeed, as of this writing, other than limited measures in support of Turkey and 
(an as yet unfulfilled) agreement to provide AWAC surveillance NATO has no formal 
role in the Syria/Iraq theatre of operations. The resecuritization of Russia, meanwhile, 
has become routine.  In the run-up to the summit in Warsaw, the language from NATO 
officials thus continued to be that of deterrence, defence and resolve138 - even a 
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contemplation of hostilities. NATO, the incoming SACEUR General Curtis Scaparrotti 
declaimed in May 2016, should be ‘ready to fight should deterrence fail.’139  
 
Conclusion:  Collective Securitization in Context 
In this article we have argued that NATO performs the act of collective securitization. In 
response to Russian action in Ukraine, the Alliance has translated successfully a 
resecuritizing move evident in discourse into concrete policy measures. The robustness 
of our case is, however, subject to three broad qualifications, respectively theoretical, 
methodological and normative.  
 Theoretically speaking, the CS has often been seen as content to describe the 
process of securitization rather than explain it.  This does not, however, render the CS 
atheoretical –a constructivist logic, after all, underpins it.140 CS also confirms the 
proposition that theory is about ‘what’ as well as ‘why’ questions.141 Our contribution 
has been to ask ‘what’ constitutes securitization in collectives where states still matter. 
If, as Thierry Balzacq suggests, ‘[t]he ways in which securitization occurs is ultimately 
an empirical question’142 then a framework which delineates that process is essential.  
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The reasons for securitization and resecuritization can be drawn from the model as 
presented. Like Stefano Guzzini, our concern is with causal mechanisms that lead to an 
‘empirical theory of securitization’, one focused on the unfolding of historical processes 
in which pre-existing policy discourses, ‘repositories of common meanings and self-
other understandings’ interact with events to ‘trigger’ (re) securitization in its various 
forms.143    
 The methodological point relates to issues set aside in our analysis. Our focus 
on NATO as actor has meant analytical compromise in three regards. First, the mutually-
dependent status of actor (NATO) and audience (its members) in the generation of 
discourse meant it was necessary to highlight the shift of language on Russia among 
important allies. But while national discourses were examined, little consideration was 
afforded to national policies. Yet NATO is, in policy terms, almost entirely dependent 
upon the contributions of its members. We acknowledge this omission but do not 
regard it as problematic analytically.  The US, NATO’s most powerful member and the 
one state whose national policy was referenced, has channeled its efforts through, and 
in concert with, NATO. Had we space for detail, the same would also have been shown 
for important European allies and, indeed, Canada. It is that choice which is important 
in policy terms. Rather than engaging in a random set of actions, the allies have 
combined in an act of collective purpose which renders our analytical treatment of 
NATO entirely appropriate.  
 A similar point concerns the shades of emphasis evident among the allies. Some 
positions - the sympathy shown toward Putin by Hungarian prime minister Victor 
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Orban or Czech president Milos Zeman – are idiosyncratic.144  Others, however, suggest 
seemingly substantive differences. Poland and the Baltic States have been the most 
insistent that NATO reorient itself to the task of collective defence; France and Germany 
have invested heavily in diplomacy; and the US and the UK have championed the cause 
of increased defence expenditure. These differences are bracketed in our analysis not 
because they have been inconsequential in debate, but simply because they have not 
prevented a NATO consensus. Indeed, what has been notable about the Ukraine crisis is 
precisely the extent of allied agreement.   There has been no debate on offering Ukraine 
a path to membership (an issue which divided NATO in 2008), and even differences of 
opinion on providing arms to Kiev conceal more than they reveal. The US, often seen as 
at odds with France and Germany on the issue, has itself been cautious:  the demand to 
arm Ukraine has come from the Republican-dominated Congress, not from the Obama 
administration.145  
 Further, in considering NATO views of Russia, we have given only indirect 
consideration to related issues that sit outside Ukraine. Some are of long pedigree 
(ballistic missile defence), others coincident in time with the Ukraine crisis (Moscow’s 
support of the Assad regime in Syria, Russia’s heightened military expenditure, snap 
military exercises, and alleged  infractions of the INF Treaty). The full logic of Russia’s 
securitization would need to survey this broader canvas. Yet our contention remains 
that the Ukraine crisis has a singular importance. Up until that precipitating event, 
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NATO-Russia relations survived in a reasonably amicable form, if increasingly marred 
by mutual fits of pique. They deteriorated rapidly thereafter. It is that break which 
merits a particular treatment.   
 The normative qualification relates to the concern that the process of 
securitization courts numerous dangers. It privileges a discourse of threat over that of 
partnership and so gives rise to policies which ramp up tensions. It is for this reason 
that CS favours desecuritization ‘where compromise, solutions and debate is made 
possible.’146 That position has been challenged by Rita Floyd who has suggested that 
there are instances when securitization can be regarded as morally acceptable.147 
Floyd’s categories of ‘moral securitization’ would repay serious attention in Russia’s 
case. Does Russia pose an objective and intersubjectively acknowledged existential 
threat to NATO? Does the Alliance have the authority to respond to that threat once 
defined? And how appropriate are the policies which NATO has pursued in addressing 
it? Answers to such questions have been addressed, in part, in our analysis. One 
enduring theme which ties them together is, however, worthy of final reflection.  
 Inherent in a critical view of securitization is a sense that it has counter-
productive effects. Here we are in the realm of two well-known but still intractable 
problems of international politics: misperception of malign intent and the security 
dilemma. The latter has assumed a worrying quality in NATO-Russia relations. 
Measures which NATO may justify as precautionary are construed in Moscow as 
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evidence of influence wielding and preparation for aggression. Russian actions are 
regarded similarly by NATO. On both sides, policies that may seem ‘tactically prudent’ 
thus ‘invite strategic misinterpretation.’148 That danger has been compounded by the 
shrinkage of dialogue. NATO and Russia have, since the Ukraine crisis, talked to one 
another primarily ‘through military signaling and by taking military actions’ according 
to one former US ambassador to the Alliance. The ‘chances’ consequently ‘of an accident 
that could escalate are greater than at any time since the 1960s.’149  
 Before writing NATO off as culpable in a slide to war, however, certain 
qualifications are in order. First, the dangers of a reignited security dilemma are 
recognized. Germany has expressed a particular sensitivity in this regard. Berlin has 
taken a firm line in opposing NATO membership for Ukraine; it has also led on the 
construction of an EU sanctions policy which nullifies the need for a more robust 
military response.150 NATO has also been open to a return to dialogue (the NATO-Russia 
Council met, albeit unproductively, in April 2016) in order to promote ‘transparency’, 
‘predictability’ and ‘strategic stability.’151 Second, NATO has itself demonstrated a 
certain restraint. While the reorientation of the Alliance has been clear since 2014, 
NATO has given no indication that it is prepared to reverse Russian behavior in Ukraine 
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through force of arms. The Alliance is not bound to Ukraine by any formal treaty 
commitment and has stayed well clear of referencing any other sort of security 
assurance (those, for instance, the UK and US extended to Kiev in the 1994 Budapest 
Memorandum).  Through 2014-2016, NATO did upgrade its assistance to Ukraine, but 
this has been limited to military career management, cyber defence, logistics, and 
command, control and communications. Merkel, Obama and others are on record that 
there is no military solution to be had in Ukraine.152  Third, and of greatest significance, 
is NATO’s collective defence posture. Here, the Alliance has demonstrated a certain 
caution. Its nuclear policy has remained (in public at least) unchanged and the 
conventional reinforcement of its eastern flank has been justified as remaining within 
the terms of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.  Through 2014-2015 it was possible to 
argue that NATO’s shift in policy had had only a negligible effect on the military balance 
in Europe – owing to long-term reductions in both European defence spending and the 
US military presence on the continent. 153  Both trends have now been reversed.  
Defence spending in NATO Europe in 2016 was projected to increase for all but three 
allies (Italy, Greece and Luxembourg),154 and the US has committed to position an 
additional armoured brigade in eastern Europe from early 2017. The impact of these 
decisions is, however, open to interpretation. There is ‘no hard evidence’ a recent study 
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has suggested ‘that the upward trend’ of defence budgets ‘is going to endure.’155 The 
American initiative, meanwhile, would if carried out result in a modest increase of 4,200 
American troops in Europe, a fraction of the approximate 165,000 US army personnel 
withdrawn from the continent since the late 1980s.156 
  The qualifications described here suggest that NATO still carries a certain 
‘security dilemma sensibility.’ As such, the logical next step is a move toward ‘modalities 
of mitigation’.157 Historical perspective here gives pause for thought. Russia’s current 
resecuritization was preceded by a desecuritization of both its Soviet predecessor and 
of Russia itself.  The logic of securitization is not, therefore, unbending, it can be undone. 
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